[Abstract]
Why do some firms matter more to autocrats than others? This paper argues that firms matter to autocrats not only as producers or taxpayers, but also as gateways into society. I develop the concept of access value: firms acquire access value when their commercial operations provide routine access to privately managed spaces and populations the regime has reason to monitor but cannot easily reach through its own agencies. I test this argument through property management firms in China, which mediate access to the gated residential compounds where most urban residents live. These compounds concentrate residents around shared property, service, and grievance issues, making them potential sites of collective action; yet they are managed by firms rather than the regime, creating a legibility gap. Using an original dataset of 7,742 residential compounds, 1,959 property management firms, and party-building discourse in Beijing, I show that firms managing more compounds, larger compounds, and politically sensitive compounds (i.e., legacy state housing and resettlement housing) are more likely to receive regime attention. Alternative explanations based on political connection, resident wealth, or crime exposure receive little support. The findings show how autocracies leverage firms’ market-based access to extend state reach, with implications for understanding state-business relations beyond China.