Peer-reviewed Articles

“Strong State, Weak Enforcement: Bureaucratic Forbearance of China's Social Insurance Policies” (with Hao Zhang). Political Science Research and Methods. 2026. [Link]
[Abstract]
Why would a strong authoritarian state choose not to enforce its own policy? We extend the theory of forbearance to authoritarian regimes, highlighting its distinct incentives and characteristics. Using China's social insurance policies as a case study, we argue that promotion-driven local officials, competing in selective political tournaments where advancement depends heavily on GDP performance, allow firms to evade payroll taxes in order to boost local economies and their own career prospects. This effect is most significant among domestic private firms and foreign firms. We conduct one of the first systematic analyses of firm-level social insurance contributions in an authoritarian context, supplemented by individual-level survey data. Our findings show that bureaucratic forbearance of China's social insurance policies has a pro-business bias, undermining the policies originally designed to address inequalities during market reforms.

Working Papers

“Political Control in the Workplace: How Autocracies Discipline Workers Without Distorting Firm Behavior” (Job Market Paper). [Link]
[Abstract]
As autocracies marketize, regimes face a dilemma: market expansion concentrates workers in privately managed workplaces where they can be mobilized against the regime, yet political intrusion to reassert control risks distorting markets. I argue that organizationally dense one-party regimes manage this tension by embedding weak but visible political institutions inside workplaces that discipline workers rather than firms and operate through symbolic presence rather than punishment. I test this argument through a multi-level analysis of Communist Party cells in China's private firms, combining firm-level panel data, employee surveys, survey experiments, and fieldwork. The results reveal a cross-level asymmetry: party cells do not systematically alter firm behavior, yet their visibility politicizes the workplace and induces employee self-censorship. Survey experiments show that merely priming a cell's presence suppresses dissent and heightens perceived risks in workplace discussions. These findings highlight a market-compatible form of control that penetrates everyday economic life while preserving market activity.
  • Best Paper Award, APSA Democracy and Autocracy Section, 2026
  • Dorothy Day Award for Outstanding Labor Research, APSA Labor Politics Related Group, 2026
  • Best Paper Designation, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, 2026
“Firms as Gateways: How Autocracies Select Business Intermediaries to Extend State Reach”
[Abstract]
Why do some firms matter more to autocrats than others? This paper argues that firms matter to autocrats not only as producers or taxpayers, but also as gateways into society. I develop the concept of access value: firms acquire access value when their commercial operations provide routine access to privately managed spaces and populations the regime has reason to monitor but cannot easily reach through its own agencies. I test this argument through property management firms in China, which mediate access to the gated residential compounds where most urban residents live. These compounds concentrate residents around shared property, service, and grievance issues, making them potential sites of collective action; yet they are managed by firms rather than the regime, creating a legibility gap. Using an original dataset of 7,742 residential compounds, 1,959 property management firms, and party-building discourse in Beijing, I show that firms managing more compounds, larger compounds, and politically sensitive compounds (i.e., legacy state housing and resettlement housing) are more likely to receive regime attention. Alternative explanations based on political connection, resident wealth, or crime exposure receive little support. The findings show how autocracies leverage firms’ market-based access to extend state reach, with implications for understanding state-business relations beyond China.
“Patronage in Plagues: Government Intervention and Essential Business Selection in the COVID-19 Lockdown” (with Zeren Li).
[Abstract]
Government tends to enhance its role in the economy during emergencies, replacing the market in resource allocation. Conventional wisdom suggests that such intervention helps assist the affected population by allocating resources more effectively and equally. However, government intervention is by no means cost-free. In this study, we analyze the cost of government intervention in public resource allocation during a state of emergency. We argue that a state of emergency exacerbates rent-seeking through patronage connections in a weak institutional context. We place our argument in the case of the two-month lockdown in Shanghai by analyzing the selection of a supply-guarantee program, in which firms are permitted to be the exclusive providers of food and essential goods during the lockdown. Our estimation draws on a case-control design that compares firms selected into the program with a random sample of non-supply-guarantee firms from all firms registered in Shanghai. We show that firms with patronage connections with incumbent leaders are significantly more likely to be selected into the program, but such an effect is not found in firms connected with former local leaders. Our study highlights the salient distributional impact of political patronage in times of crisis.

Work in Progress

“Co-Producing Political Control: Why Firms Accept Party Cells in China”
“Feminization of State Power: The Gendered Practices of Party Cells”
“Coordination and Collective Action in Chinese Workplaces”